List of states with nuclear weapons
Lua error in package.lua at line 80: module 'strict' not found.
There are eight sovereign states that have successfully detonated nuclear weapons.[1] Five are considered to be "nuclear-weapon states" (NWS) under the terms of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). In order of acquisition of nuclear weapons these are: the United States, Russia (successor state to the Soviet Union), the United Kingdom, France, and China.
Since the NPT entered into force in 1970, three states that were not parties to the Treaty have conducted nuclear tests, namely India, Pakistan, and North Korea. North Korea had been a party to the NPT but withdrew in 2003. Israel is also widely presumed to have nuclear weapons, though it maintains a policy of deliberate ambiguity regarding this, and is not known definitively to have conducted a nuclear test.[2] According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute's SIPRI Yearbook of 2014, Israel is estimated to have approximately 80 nuclear warheads.[3] Furthermore, according to Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Nuclear Notebook 2014, the total number of nuclear weapons worldwide is estimated at 10,144.[4]
South Africa has the unique status of a nation that developed nuclear weapons but then disassembled its arsenal before joining the NPT. This means that there are three European countries, one country in North America, zero in South America, four Asian countries, zero Oceanian countries and zero African countries that are known to have nuclear weapons.[5] Nations that are known or thought to have nuclear weapons are sometimes referred to informally as the nuclear club.
Contents
- 1 Statistics and force configuration
- 2 Five nuclear-weapon states under the NPT
- 3 Other states declaring possession of nuclear weapons
- 4 Other states believed to possess nuclear weapons
- 5 Nuclear weapons sharing
- 6 States formerly possessing nuclear weapons
- 7 See also
- 8 Notes
- 9 References
- 10 Bibliography
- 11 External links
Statistics and force configuration
Lua error in package.lua at line 80: module 'strict' not found. The following is a list of states that have admitted the possession of nuclear weapons, the approximate number of warheads under their control, and the year they tested their first weapon and their force configuration. This list is informally known in global politics as the "Nuclear Club."[6] With the exception of Russia and the United States (which have subjected their nuclear forces to independent verification under various treaties) these figures are estimates, in some cases quite unreliable estimates. In particular, under the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty thousands of Russian and U.S. nuclear warheads are inactive in stockpiles awaiting processing. The fissile material contained in the warheads can then be recycled for use in nuclear reactors.
From a high of 68,000 active weapons in 1985, as of 2015[update] there are some 4,000 active nuclear warheads and 10,300 total nuclear warheads in the world.[1] Many of the decommissioned weapons were simply stored or partially dismantled, not destroyed.[7]
It is also noteworthy that since the dawn of the Atomic Age the delivery methods of most states with nuclear weapons has evolved with some achieving a nuclear triad while others have consolidated away from land and air deterrents to submarine based forces.
Country | Warheads (Active/Total)[nb 1] | Date of first test | CTBT status | Delivery methods | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
The five nuclear-weapon states under the NPT | |||||
United States | 1,750 / 6,970[1] | 16 July 1945 ("Trinity") | Signatory[8] | Nuclear triad[9] | |
Russia | 1,790 / 7,300[1] | 29 August 1949 ("RDS-1") | Ratifier[8] | Nuclear triad[10] | |
United Kingdom | 150 / 215[1] | 3 October 1952 ("Hurricane") | Ratifier[8] | Sea-based[11][nb 2] | |
France | 290 / 300[1] | 13 February 1960 ("Gerboise Bleue") | Ratifier[8] | Sea and air-based[12][nb 3] | |
China | n.a. / 260[1] | 16 October 1964 ("596") | Signatory[8] | Suspected nuclear triad.[13][14] | |
Non-NPT nuclear powers | |||||
India | n.a. / 110–120[1] | 18 May 1974 ("Smiling Buddha") | Non-signatory[8] | Developing nuclear triad.[15][16][17] | |
Pakistan | n.a. / 120–130[1] | 28 May 1998 ("Chagai-I") | Non-signatory[8] | Land and air-based.[18][19] | |
North Korea | n.a. / <10[1] | 9 October 2006[20] | Non-signatory[8] | Suspected land-based.[21] | |
Undeclared nuclear powers | |||||
Israel | n.a. / est. 60–400[1][22][23] | 1960–1979[24] incl. suspected Vela Incident[25] | Signatory[8] | Suspected nuclear triad.[26][27] |
Five nuclear-weapon states under the NPT
<templatestyles src="Module:Hatnote/styles.css"></templatestyles>
These five states are also the UN Security Council's permanent members with veto power.
United States
<templatestyles src="Module:Hatnote/styles.css"></templatestyles>
The United States developed the first atomic weapons, during World War II in cooperation with the United Kingdom and Canada as part of the Manhattan Project, out of the fear that Nazi Germany would develop them first. It tested the first nuclear weapon July 16th, 1945 ("Trinity") at 5:30 am, and remains the only country to have used nuclear weapons against an enemy state in warfare, devastating the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It was the first nation to develop the hydrogen bomb, testing an experimental prototype in 1952 ("Ivy Mike") and a deployable weapon in 1954 ("Castle Bravo"). Throughout the Cold War it continued to modernize and enlarge its nuclear arsenal, but from 1992 on has been involved primarily in a program of Stockpile stewardship.[28][29][30] The U.S. nuclear arsenal contained 31,175 warheads at its Cold War height (in 1966).[31] During the Cold War the United States built approximately 70,000 nuclear warheads, more than all other nuclear-weapon states combined.[32][33]
Russian Federation (formerly Soviet Union)
<templatestyles src="Module:Hatnote/styles.css"></templatestyles>
The Soviet Union tested its first nuclear weapon ("RDS-1") in 1949, in a crash project developed partially with espionage obtained during and after World War II (see: Soviet atomic bomb project). The Soviet Union was the second nation to have developed and tested a nuclear weapon. The direct motivation for Soviet weapons development was to achieve a balance of power during the Cold War. It tested its first megaton-range hydrogen bomb ("RDS-37") in 1955. The Soviet Union also tested the most powerful explosive ever detonated by humans, ("Tsar Bomba"), with a theoretical yield of 100 megatons, intentionally reduced to 50 when detonated. After its dissolution in 1991, the Soviet weapons entered officially into the possession of the Russian Federation.[34] The Soviet nuclear arsenal contained some 45,000 warheads at its peak (in 1986); the Soviet Union built about 55,000 nuclear warheads since 1949.[33]
United Kingdom
<templatestyles src="Module:Hatnote/styles.css"></templatestyles>
The United Kingdom tested its first nuclear weapon ("Hurricane") in 1952. The UK had provided considerable impetus and initial research for the early conception of the atomic bomb, aided by the presence of refugee scientists working in British laboratories who had fled the continent. It collaborated closely with the United States and Canada during the Manhattan Project, but had to develop its own method for manufacturing and detonating a bomb as U.S. secrecy grew after 1945. The United Kingdom was the third country in the world, after the United States and Soviet Union, to develop and test a nuclear weapon. Its programme was motivated to have an independent deterrent against the Soviet Union, while also maintaining its status as a great power. It tested its first hydrogen bomb in 1957 (Operation Grapple), making it the third country to do so after the United States and Soviet Union.[35][36] The UK maintained a fleet of V bomber strategic bombers and ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) equipped with nuclear weapons during the Cold War. It currently maintains a fleet of four 'Vanguard' class ballistic missile submarines equipped with Trident II missiles. The British government announced a replacement to the current system to take place between 2007-2024.
France
<templatestyles src="Module:Hatnote/styles.css"></templatestyles>
France tested its first nuclear weapon in 1960 ("Gerboise Bleue"), based mostly on its own research. It was motivated by the Suez Crisis diplomatic tension vis-à-vis both the Soviet Union and the Free World allies United States and United Kingdom. It was also relevant to retain great power status, alongside the United Kingdom, during the post-colonial Cold War (see: Force de frappe). France tested its first hydrogen bomb in 1968 ("Opération Canopus"). After the Cold War, France has disarmed 175 warheads with the reduction and modernization of its arsenal that has now evolved to a dual system based on submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and medium-range air-to-surface missiles (Rafale fighter-bombers). However new nuclear weapons are in development[citation needed] and reformed nuclear squadrons were trained during Enduring Freedom operations in Afghanistan.[citation needed] France signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1992.[37] In January 2006, President Jacques Chirac stated a terrorist act or the use of weapons of mass destruction against France would result in a nuclear counterattack.[38] In February 2015, President Francois Hollande stressed the need for a nuclear deterrent in "a dangerous world". He also detailed the French deterrent as "less than 300" nuclear warheads, three sets of 16 submarine-launched ballistic missiles and 54 medium-range air-to-surface missiles" and urged other states to show similar transparency.[39]
China
<templatestyles src="Module:Hatnote/styles.css"></templatestyles>
China tested its first nuclear weapon device ("596") in 1964 at the Lop Nur test site. The weapon was developed as a deterrent against both the United States and the Soviet Union. Two years later, China had a fission bomb capable of being put onto a nuclear missile. It tested its first hydrogen bomb ("Test No. 6") in 1967, a mere 32 months after testing its first nuclear weapon (the shortest fission-to-fusion development known in history).[40] The country is currently thought to have had a stockpile of around 240 warheads, though because of the limited information available, estimates range from 100 to 400.[41][42][43] China is the only NPT nuclear-weapon state to give an unqualified negative security assurance due to its "no first use" policy.[44][45] China signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1992.[37] On February 25, 2015 U.S. Vice Admiral Joseph Mulloy stated to the House Armed Services Committee's seapower subcommittee that the U.S. does not believe the PLAN currently deploys SLBMs on their submarine fleet.[46]
Other states declaring possession of nuclear weapons
India
<templatestyles src="Module:Hatnote/styles.css"></templatestyles>
India is not a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. India tested what it called a "peaceful nuclear explosive" in 1974 (which became known as "Smiling Buddha"). The test was the first test developed after the creation of the NPT, and created new questions about how civilian nuclear technology could be diverted secretly to weapons purposes (dual-use technology). India's secret development caused great concern and anger particularly from nations, such as Canada, that had supplied its nuclear reactors for peaceful and power generating needs.
Indian officials rejected the NPT in the 1960s on the grounds that it created a world of nuclear "haves" and "have-nots", arguing that it unnecessarily restricted "peaceful activity" (including "peaceful nuclear explosives"), and that India would not accede to international control of their nuclear facilities unless all other countries engaged in unilateral disarmament of their own nuclear weapons. The Indian position has also asserted that the NPT is in many ways a neo-colonial regime designed to deny security to post-colonial powers.[47] Even after its 1974 test, India maintained that its nuclear capability was primarily "peaceful", but between 1988 and 1990 it apparently weaponized two dozen nuclear weapons for delivery by air.[48] In 1998 India tested weaponized nuclear warheads ("Operation Shakti"), including a thermonuclear device.[49]
In July 2005, U.S. President George W. Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh announced plans to conclude an Indo-US civilian nuclear agreement.[50] This came to fruition through a series of steps that included India’s announced plan to separate its civil and military nuclear programs in March 2006,[51] the passage of the India–United States Civil Nuclear Agreement by the U.S. Congress in December 2006, the conclusion of a U.S.–India nuclear cooperation agreement in July 2007,[52] approval by the IAEA of an India-specific safeguards agreement,[53] agreement by the Nuclear Suppliers Group to a waiver of export restrictions for India,[54] approval by the U.S. Congress[55] and culminating in the signature of U.S.–India agreement for civil nuclear cooperation[56] in October 2008. The U.S. State Department said it made it "very clear that we will not recognize India as a nuclear-weapon state".[57] The United States is bound by the Hyde Act with India and may cease all cooperation with India if India detonates a nuclear explosive device. The US had further said it is not its intention to assist India in the design, construction or operation of sensitive nuclear technologies through the transfer of dual-use items.[58] In establishing an exemption for India, the Nuclear Suppliers Group reserved the right to consult on any future issues which might trouble it.[59] As of early 2013, India was estimated to have had a stockpile of around 90–110 warheads.[1] But presently, complete information about India's current nuclear deployment and future expansions are highly classified.
Pakistan
<templatestyles src="Module:Hatnote/styles.css"></templatestyles>
Pakistan also is not a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Pakistan covertly developed nuclear weapons over decades, beginning in the late 1970s. Pakistan first delved into nuclear power after the establishment of its first nuclear power plant near Karachi with equipment and materials supplied mainly by western nations in the early 1970s. Pakistani President Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto promised in 1971 that if India could build nuclear weapons then Pakistan would too, according to him: "We will develop Nuclear stockpiles, even if we have to eat grass."
It is believed that Pakistan has possessed nuclear weapons since the mid-1980s.[60] The United States continued to certify that Pakistan did not possess such weapons until 1990, when sanctions were imposed under the Pressler Amendment, requiring a cutoff of U.S. economic and military assistance to Pakistan.[61] In 1998, Pakistan conducted its first six nuclear tests at the Ras Koh Hills in response to the five tests conducted by India a few weeks before.
In 2004, the Pakistani metallurgist A.Q. Khan, a key figure in Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, confessed to heading an international black market ring involved in selling nuclear weapons technology. In particular, Khan had been selling gas centrifuge technology to North Korea, Iran, and Libya. Khan denied complicity by the Pakistani government or Army, but this has been called into question by journalists and IAEA officials, and was later contradicted by statements from Khan himself.[62]
As of early 2013, Pakistan was estimated to have had a stockpile of around 100–120 warheads,[1] and in November 2014 it was projected that by 2020 Pakistan would have enough fissile material for 200 warheads.[63]
North Korea
<templatestyles src="Module:Hatnote/styles.css"></templatestyles>
North Korea was a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, but announced a withdrawal on January 10, 2003, after the United States accused it of having a secret uranium enrichment program and cut off energy assistance under the 1994 Agreed Framework. In February 2005, North Korea claimed to possess functional nuclear weapons, though their lack of a test at the time led many experts to doubt the claim. However, in October 2006, North Korea stated that due to growing intimidation by the USA, it would conduct a nuclear test to confirm its nuclear status. North Korea reported a successful nuclear test on October 9, 2006 (see 2006 North Korean nuclear test). Most U.S. intelligence officials believe that North Korea did, in fact, test a nuclear device due to radioactive isotopes detected by U.S. aircraft; however, most agree that the test was probably only partially successful.[64] The yield may have been less than a kiloton, which is much smaller than the first successful tests of other powers; boosted fission weapons may have an unboosted yield in this range, which is sufficient to start deuterium-tritium fusion in the boost gas at the center; the fast neutrons from fusion then ensure a full fission yield. North Korea conducted a second, higher yield test on 25 May 2009 (see 2009 North Korean nuclear test) and a third test with still higher yield on 12 February 2013 (see 2013 North Korean nuclear test). North Korea claimed to have conducted its first H-bomb test on 5 January 2016, though measurements of seismic disturbances indicate that the detonation was not consistent with a hydrogen bomb.[65]
Other states believed to possess nuclear weapons
Israel
<templatestyles src="Module:Hatnote/styles.css"></templatestyles>
Israel is widely believed to have been the sixth country in the world to develop nuclear weapons, with "rudimentary, but deliverable," nuclear weapons available as early as 1967.[66] Israel is not a party to the NPT. Israel engages in strategic ambiguity, saying it would not be the first country to "introduce" nuclear weapons into the region, but refusing to otherwise confirm or deny a nuclear weapons program or arsenal. This policy of "nuclear opacity" has been interpreted as an attempt to get the benefits of deterrence with a minimum political cost.[66][67] In 1968, the Israeli Ambassador to the United States, Yitzhak Rabin, affirmed to the United States State Department that Israel would "not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East." Upon further questioning about what "introduce" meant in this context, however, he said that "he would not consider a weapon that had not been tested a weapon," and affirmed that he did not believe that "an unadvertised, untested nuclear device" was really "a nuclear weapon." He also agreed, however, that an "advertised but untested" device would be considered "introduction." This has been interpreted to mean that official Israeli policy was that the country could possess a nuclear weapon without technically "introducing" it, so long as it did not test it, and as long as it was "unadvertised".[68][69]
In 1986, a former Dimona technician, Mordechai Vanunu, disclosed extensive information about the nuclear program to the British press, including photographs of the secret areas of the nuclear site, some of which depicted nuclear weapons cores and designs. Vanunu gave detailed descriptions of lithium-6 separation required for the production of tritium, an essential ingredient of fusion-boosted fission bombs, as well as information about the rate of plutonium production. Vanunu's evidence was vetted by experienced technical experts before publication, and is considered to be among the strongest evidence for the advanced state of the Israeli nuclear weapons program.[67][70] Theodore Taylor, a former U.S. nuclear device design expert and physicist leading the field[71] especially in small and efficient nuclear weapons, reviewed the 1986 Vanunu leaks and photographs in detail. Taylor concluded that Israel's thermonuclear weapon designs appeared to be "less complex than those of other nations," and at the time of the 1986 leaks "not capable of producing yields in the megaton or higher range." Nevertheless, "they may produce at least several times the yield of fission weapons with the same quantity of plutonium or highly enriched uranium." In other words, Israel could "boost" the yield of its nuclear fission weapons. According to Taylor, the uncertainties involved in the process of boosting required more than theoretical analysis for full confidence in the weapons' performance. Taylor therefore concluded that Israel had "unequivocally" tested a miniaturized nuclear device. The Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) concluded after reviewing the evidence given by Vanunu that as of 1987, "the Israelis are roughly where the U.S. was in the fission weapon field in about 1955 to 1960." and would require supercomputers or parallel computing clusters to refine their hydrogen bomb designs for improved yields without testing, though noting in 1987 they were already then developing the computer code base required.[72] Israel was first permitted to import US built supercomputers beginning in November 1995.[72]
In a paper by the USAF Counterproliferation Center researcher Lieutenant Colonel Warner D. Farr wrote that much lateral proliferation happened between pre-nuclear France and Israel stating "the French nuclear test in 1960 made two nuclear powers not one—such was the depth of collaboration" and "the Israelis had unrestricted access to French nuclear test explosion data." minimizing the need for early Israeli testing.[73] West Germany army magazine, Wehrtechnik ("military technology"), claimed that western intelligence documented that Israel had conducted an underground test in the Negev in 1963.[74] There is also speculation that Israel may have tested a nuclear weapon along with South Africa in 1979, but this has not been confirmed, and interpretation of the Vela Incident is controversial. The stated purpose of the Negev Nuclear Research Center near Dimona is to advance basic nuclear science and applied research on nuclear energy.[75]
According to the Natural Resources Defense Council and the Federation of American Scientists, Israel likely possesses around 75–200 nuclear weapons.[22][76] The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute estimates that Israel has approximately 80 intact nuclear weapons, of which 50 are for delivery by Jericho II medium-range ballistic missiles and 30 are gravity bombs for delivery by aircraft. SIPRI also reports that there was renewed speculation in 2012 that Israel may also have developed nuclear-capable submarine-launched cruise missiles.[77]
Nuclear weapons sharing
Country | Air base | Custodian | Warheads |
---|---|---|---|
Belgium | Kleine Brogel | 52d Fighter Wing | 10~20 |
Germany | Büchel | 52d Fighter Wing | 20 |
Italy | Ghedi Torre | 52d Fighter Wing | 10~20 |
Aviano | 31st Fighter Wing | 50 | |
Netherlands | Volkel | 52d Fighter Wing | 10~20 |
Turkey | Incirlik | 39th Air Base Wing | 60~70 |
Total | 150~200 |
- Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Turkey
<templatestyles src="Module:Hatnote/styles.css"></templatestyles>
Under NATO nuclear weapons sharing, the United States has provided nuclear weapons for Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey to deploy and store.[79] This involves pilots and other staff of the "non-nuclear" NATO states practicing, handling, and delivering the U.S. nuclear bombs, and adapting non-U.S. warplanes to deliver U.S. nuclear bombs. However, since all U.S. nuclear weapons are protected with Permissive Action Links, the host states cannot arm the bombs without authorization codes from the U.S. Department of Defense.[80] Former Italian President Francesco Cossiga acknowledged the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in Italy.[81] U.S. nuclear weapons were also deployed in Canada until 1984, and in Greece until 2001 for nuclear sharing purposes.[82]
Members of the Non-Aligned Movement have called on all countries to "refrain from nuclear sharing for military purposes under any kind of security arrangements."[83] The Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad (ISSI) has criticized the arrangement for allegedly violating Articles I and II of the NPT, arguing that "these Articles do not permit the NWS to delegate the control of their nuclear weapons directly or indirectly to others."[84] NATO has argued that the weapons' sharing is compliant with the NPT because "the U.S. nuclear weapons based in Europe are in the sole possession and under constant and complete custody and control of the United States."[85]
States formerly possessing nuclear weapons
Nuclear weapons have been present in many nations, often as staging grounds under control of other powers. However, in only one instance has a nation given up nuclear weapons after being in control of them; in most cases this has been because of special political circumstances. The fall of the Soviet Union left several former Soviet republics in physical possession of nuclear weapons, though not operational control which was dependent on Russian-controlled electronic Permissive Action Links and the Russian command and control system.[86][87]
South Africa
<templatestyles src="Module:Hatnote/styles.css"></templatestyles>
South Africa produced six nuclear weapons in the 1980s, but disassembled them in the early 1990s. In 1979, there was a putative detection of a covert nuclear test in the Indian Ocean, called the Vela incident. It has long been speculated that it was possibly a test by Israel, in collaboration with and support of South Africa, though this has never been confirmed. South Africa could not have constructed such a nuclear bomb until November 1979, two months after the "double flash" incident. South Africa signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1991.[89] [90]
Former Soviet countries
<templatestyles src="Module:Hatnote/styles.css"></templatestyles>
- Belarus had 81 single warhead missiles stationed on its territory after the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. They were all transferred to Russia by 1996. In May 1992, Belarus acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.[91]
- Kazakhstan inherited 1,400 nuclear weapons from the Soviet Union, and transferred them all to Russia by 1995. Kazakhstan has since acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.[92]
- Ukraine has acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Ukraine inherited about 5,000 nuclear weapons when it became independent from the Soviet Union in 1991, making its nuclear arsenal the third-largest in the world.[93] By 1996, Ukraine had agreed to dispose of all nuclear weapons within its territory, with the condition that its borders were respected, as part of the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances. The warheads were disassembled in Russia.[94] Despite Russia's subsequent and internationally disputed annexation of Crimea in 2014, Ukraine reaffirmed its 1994 decision to accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon state.[95]
See also
- Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
- Doomsday Clock
- Historical nuclear weapons stockpiles and nuclear tests by country
- Nuclear disarmament
- Nuclear proliferation
- Nuclear war
- Nuclear terrorism
- Nuclear-weapon-free zone
- Nuclear power
- No first use
Notes
- ↑ All numbers are estimates from the Federation of American Scientists. The latest update was in September 2015. If differences between active and total stockpile are known, they are given as two figures separated by a forward slash. If specifics are not available (n.a.), only one figure is given. Stockpile number may not contain all intact warheads if a substantial amount of warheads are scheduled for but have not yet gone through dismantlement; not all "active" warheads are deployed at any given time. When a range of weapons is given (e.g., 0–10), it generally indicates that the estimate is being made on the amount of fissile material that has likely been produced, and the amount of fissile material needed per warhead depends on estimates of a country's proficiency at nuclear weapon design.
- ↑ From the 1960s until the 1990s, the United Kingdom's Royal Air Force maintained the independent capability to deliver nuclear weapons via its V bomber fleet.
- ↑ France formerly possessed a nuclear triad until 1996 and the retirement of its land-based arsenal.
References
- ↑ 1.00 1.01 1.02 1.03 1.04 1.05 1.06 1.07 1.08 1.09 1.10 1.11 1.12 Lua error in package.lua at line 80: module 'strict' not found.
- ↑ Lua error in package.lua at line 80: module 'strict' not found.
- ↑ Nuclear Forces, sipri.org
- ↑ Nuclear Notebook, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, thebulletin.org, 2014
- ↑ Arms Control and Global Security, Paul R. Viotti - 2010, p 312
- ↑ "Nuclear club," Oxford English Dictionary: "nuclear club n. the nations that possess nuclear weapons." The term's first cited usage is from 1957.
- ↑ Webster, Paul (July/August 2003). "[1]," The Guardian.
- ↑ 8.0 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.5 8.6 8.7 8.8 Lua error in package.lua at line 80: module 'strict' not found.
- ↑ IISS 2012, pp. 54–55
- ↑ IISS 2012, p. 192
- ↑ IISS 2012, p. 169
- ↑ IISS 2012, p. 111
- ↑ The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia by Muthiah Alagappa (NUS Press, 2009), page 169: "China has developed strategic nuclear forces made up of land-based missiles, submarine-launched missiles, and bombers. Within this triad, China has also developed weapons of different ranges, capabilities, and survivability."
- ↑ IISS 2012, pp. 223-224
- ↑ IISS 2012, p. 243
- ↑ Lua error in package.lua at line 80: module 'strict' not found.
- ↑ Lua error in package.lua at line 80: module 'strict' not found.
- ↑ IISS 2012, p. 272
- ↑ Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons, By Bhumitra Chakma, (Routledge 2012), page 61: "Pakistan possesses two types of nuclear delivery vehicles: aircraft and missiles. Initially in the pre-tests era, Islamabad depended solely on aircraft as its chief means of delivering nuclear weapons. In the early 1990s, Pakistan acquired a few dozen ballistic missiles from China, and subsequently, it developed a number of missile systems which became its mainstay of nuclear delivery".
- ↑ Lua error in package.lua at line 80: module 'strict' not found.
- ↑ Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia: Crisis Behaviour and the Bomb by Sumit Ganguly, Sumit Ganguly, S. Paul Kapur, (Routledge 2008), page 194-195
- ↑ 22.0 22.1 There are a wide range of estimates as to the size of the Israeli nuclear arsenal. For a compiled list of estimates, see Avner Cohen, The Worst-Kept Secret: Israel's bargain with the Bomb (Columbia University Press, 2010), Table 1, page xxvii and page 82.
- ↑ Lua error in package.lua at line 80: module 'strict' not found..
- ↑ Farr, Warner D (September 1999), The Third Temple's holy of holies: Israel's nuclear weapons, The Counterproliferation Papers, Future Warfare Series 2, USAF Counterproliferation Center, Air War College, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, retrieved July 2, 2006.
- ↑ *Lua error in package.lua at line 80: module 'strict' not found., page 271
- ↑ An Atlas of Middle Eastern Affairs By Ewan W. Anderson, Liam D. Anderson, (Routledge 2013), page 233: "In terms of delivery systems, there is strong evidence that Israel now possesses all three elements of the nuclear triad."
- ↑ IISS 2012, p. 328
- ↑ Lua error in package.lua at line 80: module 'strict' not found.
- ↑ Lua error in package.lua at line 80: module 'strict' not found.
- ↑ Stephen I. Schwartz, ed., Atomic Audit: The Costs and Consequences of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Since 1940 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1998).
- ↑ Lua error in package.lua at line 80: module 'strict' not found.
- ↑ http://docs.nrdc.org/nuclear/files/nuc_01049601a_160.pdf
- ↑ 33.0 33.1 Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, "Global nuclear stockpiles, 1945-2006," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 62, no. 4 (July/August 2006), 64-66...
- ↑ Lua error in package.lua at line 80: module 'strict' not found.
- ↑ Lua error in package.lua at line 80: module 'strict' not found.
- ↑ Lua error in package.lua at line 80: module 'strict' not found.
- ↑ 37.0 37.1 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs.
- ↑ France 'would use nuclear arms' (BBC, January 2006)
- ↑ Lua error in package.lua at line 80: module 'strict' not found.
- ↑ John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1988). ISBN 0-8047-1452-5
- ↑ [2][3][dead link][4]
- ↑ Norris, Robert S. and Hans M. Kristensen. "Chinese nuclear forces, 2006[dead link]," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 62:3 (May/June 2006): 60-63.
- ↑ Lewis, Jeffery. "The ambiguous arsenal[dead link]," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 61:3 (May/June 2005): 52-59.
- ↑ Lua error in package.lua at line 80: module 'strict' not found.
- ↑ Lua error in package.lua at line 80: module 'strict' not found.
- ↑ Lua error in package.lua at line 80: module 'strict' not found.
- ↑ George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 120-121, and 7.
- ↑ George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 293–297.
- ↑ Lua error in package.lua at line 80: module 'strict' not found.
- ↑ Lua error in package.lua at line 80: module 'strict' not found.
- ↑ Implementation of the India-United States Joint Statement of July 18, 2005: India’s Separation Plan
- ↑ U.S.–India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative – Bilateral Agreement on Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation
- ↑ Lua error in package.lua at line 80: module 'strict' not found.
- ↑ Statement on Civil Nuclear Cooperation with India
- ↑ Congressional Approval of the U.S.–India Agreement for Cooperation Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (123 Agreement)
- ↑ Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Indian Minister of External Affairs Pranab Mukherjee At the Signing of the U.S.-India Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Agreement
- ↑ Interview With Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Robert Joseph, Arms Control Today, May 2006.
- ↑ Was India misled by America on nuclear deal?, Indian Express.
- ↑ ACA: Final NSG Statement
- ↑ NTI Pakistan Profile, retrieved 22 April 2012.
- ↑ Lua error in package.lua at line 80: module 'strict' not found.
- ↑ See A.Q. Khan: Investigation, dismissal, confession, pardon and aftermath, for citations and details.
- ↑ Lua error in package.lua at line 80: module 'strict' not found.
- ↑ Lua error in package.lua at line 80: module 'strict' not found.[dead link]
- ↑ Lua error in package.lua at line 80: module 'strict' not found.
- ↑ 66.0 66.1 NTI Israel Profile Retrieved July 12, 2007.
- ↑ 67.0 67.1 Lua error in package.lua at line 80: module 'strict' not found.
- ↑ Memcon, "Negotiations with Israel - 4F and Advanced Weapons," November 8, 1968 and Memcon, "Negotiations with Israel - F4 and Advanced Weapons," November 12, 1968, both part of National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 189, "Israel Crosses the Threshold" (April 28, 2006)
- ↑ Avner Cohen and William Burr, "The Untold Story of Israel's Bomb," Washington Post, April 30, 2006; B01.
- ↑ Lua error in package.lua at line 80: module 'strict' not found.
- ↑ [5][dead link]
- ↑ 72.0 72.1 Israel's Nuclear Weapon Capability: An Overview
- ↑ Lua error in package.lua at line 80: module 'strict' not found.
- ↑ https://fas.org/nuke/guide/israel/nuke/farr.htm IV. 1974-1999: Bringing the Bomb up the Basement Stairs (paragraph 3)
- ↑ Lua error in package.lua at line 80: module 'strict' not found.
- ↑ Israel's Nuclear Weapons, Federation of American Scientists (August 17, 2000)
- ↑ Lua error in package.lua at line 80: module 'strict' not found.
- ↑ Lua error in package.lua at line 80: module 'strict' not found.
- ↑ Lua error in package.lua at line 80: module 'strict' not found.
- ↑ Lua error in package.lua at line 80: module 'strict' not found.
- ↑ Lua error in package.lua at line 80: module 'strict' not found.
- ↑ Lua error in package.lua at line 80: module 'strict' not found.
- ↑ Statement on behalf of the non-aligned state parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 2 May 2005
- ↑ ISSI - NPT in 2000: Challenges ahead, Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, The Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad Archived January 9, 2009 at the Wayback Machine
- ↑ NATO's Positions Regarding Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament and Related Issues, NATO
- ↑ Lua error in package.lua at line 80: module 'strict' not found.
- ↑ Lua error in package.lua at line 80: module 'strict' not found.
- ↑ Lua error in package.lua at line 80: module 'strict' not found.
- ↑ Nuclear Weapons Program (South Africa), Federation of American Scientists (May 29, 2000).
- ↑ Von Wielligh, N. & von Wielligh-Steyn, L. (2015). The Bomb – South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Programme. Pretoria: Litera.
- ↑ Lua error in package.lua at line 80: module 'strict' not found.
- ↑ Lua error in package.lua at line 80: module 'strict' not found.
- ↑ Ukraine Special Weapons, GlobalSecurity.org
- ↑ Lua error in package.lua at line 80: module 'strict' not found.
- ↑ Joint Statement by the United States and Ukraine, March 25, 2014.
Bibliography
- Lua error in package.lua at line 80: module 'strict' not found.
- Lua error in package.lua at line 80: module 'strict' not found..
External links
- Archive of Nuclear Data - List of warheads by country
- Globalsecurity.org – World Special Weapons Guide
- The Nuclear Weapon Archive
- Nuclear Notebook from Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
- U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe: A review of post-Cold War policy, force levels, and war planning NRDC, February 2005
- Online NewsHour with Jim Lehrer:Tracking Nuclear Proliferation
- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute's data on world nuclear forces
- Nuclear Proliferation International History Project For more on the history of nuclear proliferation see the Woodrow Wilson Center's Nuclear Proliferation International History Project website.
- Proliferation Watch: US Intelligence Assessments of Potential Nuclear Powers, 1977–2001
- Articles with dead external links from February 2016
- Articles containing potentially dated statements from 2015
- Articles with unsourced statements from November 2013
- Pages with broken file links
- Nuclear weapons
- Military comparisons lists of countries
- Nuclear weapons policy
- Nuclear proliferation
- Nuclear technology-related lists
- Cold War